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Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory 





All thinking has to start from acquaintance; but it succeeds in thinking about 
many things with which we have no acquaintance.   
– Bertrand Russell 
 
Acquaintance is a condition on the possibility of thought and justification. 




Karl experiences a tomato of a round and somewhat bulgy shape. He believes that rabbits 
are getting into his garden. He worries that democracy is in trouble. He is confident that 
68 plus 57 will always make 125.  
In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to 
what extent, do the non-intentional facts about Karl determine such intentional facts? 
There are two popular approaches. First, the reductive externalist program. The austere 
physical facts about Karl are the only facts. Original intentionality reduces to informa-
tional-teleological relations between Karl’s brain and the world. I will use “tracking rela-
tions” as neutral term for this kind of relations. Second, there is the totally different phe-
nomenal intentionality program. According to it, the intentional contents of Karl’s conscious 
experiences are determined by his internal brain states, not tracking relations to the envi-
ronment. And his internal conscious experiences play a crucial role in pinning down the 
contents of his mental states.  
I will argue against both approaches. I will agree with friends of phenomenal inten-
tionality that reductive externalists neglect the role of our internally-determined con-
scious experiences in grounding intentionality. But I will fault them for not adequately 
explaining intentionality. They cannot just say “conscious experience explains it” and 
leave it at that. However, I will sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating 
ideas from both camps. In particular, by appealing to Lewisian ideas, we can explain how 
Karl’s conscious experiences help to ground the contents of his other mental states. The 
result is a “consciousness first” approach to intentionality.  
My plan is as follows. In §1 and §2 I will catalogue problems for the reductive exter-
nalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. Along the way, I will lay 
down desiderata for a theory of intentionality. In §3, I will sketch my alternative multi-
stage theory and show how it might satisfy those desiderata. 
 
1. PROBLEMS WITH THE REDUCTIVE EXTERNALIST PROGRAM 
 
In §1.1 and §1.2 I catalogue problems for specific ideas within the reductive externalist 
program. In §1.3 I raise a more general problem. All the problems concern the connec-
tion between intentionality and conscious experience.  
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1.1 The problem of experiential indeterminacy 
My first problem for the reductive externalist program concerns how to determine Karl’s 
sensory-perceptual experiences. I will assume intentionalism (Chalmers 2010, Dretske 
1995, Horgan 2014, Tye 2019). Experiential phenomenology and intentionality are insep-
arable. The phenomenology Karl’s experiences is a matter of what perceptible properties 
he is conscious of (in other words, “experientially represents”). So determining his experi-
ences is a special case of the problem of intentionality.  
Roughly, a reductive externalist account of experiential intentionality goes as follows. 
The perceptible properties (“qualia”) are response-independent physical properties (re-
flectance-types, chemical-types, etc.). The conscious-of relation is a complex tracking re-
lation between subjects and such physical properties. For instance, for Karl to be con-
scious of the quality red (a certain reflectance-type), and have a “reddish” experience, is 
for Karl to undergo a subpersonal brain state that has the biological function of tracking 
(being produced by) the occurrence of red and that is poised to influence the cognitive 
system. The result is reductive externalist intentionalism about phenomenology (Dretske 
1995, Tye 2019).  
But indeterminacy worries undermine this view. Let me summarize two illustrations 








Figure 1: Black-and-white earth (left) and middle earth (right) 
 
First, imagine that Karl and his kind evolved on black-and-white earth. On black-and-
white earth, the following things are true. First, surfaces of all object are either black or 
white – this is why I call it “black-and-white earth”. Second, every object contains a small-
er object. In particular, black outer objects contain red inner objects and white outer ob-
jects contain green inner objects. But the objects are impenetrable. Third, the color of the 
inner object and that of the outer object are causally yoked together by way of a natural, 
super-fast chemical process.  
Now suppose Karl views a black object containing a red inner object (Figure 1, left). 
Does Karl have a “blackish” experience or a “reddish” experience? I intentionality de-
scribed the example in physical terms, leaving open the character of his experience. Re-
ductive externalists about phenomenology might say that Karl appropriately tracks, and 
thereby is conscious of (“experientially represents”), the outer black only. In that case, he 
has a blackish experience. Alternatively, reductive externalists might say that Karl appro-
priately tracks, and thereby is conscious of (“experientially represents”), the more distal 
inner red. On this account, although the outer black is part of the causal process, Karl isn’t 
conscious of it – anymore than he is conscious of his retinas or the light. It is just part of 
the causal process that enables him to be conscious of the inner red. In that case, he has a 
reddish experience. If the austere physical facts are all the facts, it’s hard to see what could 
make one of these accounts determinately correct and the other incorrect.   
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My second example (Figure 1, right) is arrived at in two stages. First, Harry is on earth 
and Sally is on inverted earth. Harry looks at the sky. His brain state B has the function of 
tracking the blue of the sky. So, according to reductive externalism about experience, B 
enables them to be conscious of the blue of the sky and to have an experience with a “blu-
ish” phenomenology. On inverted earth, the sky is yellow. Even though the sky is yellow, 
it puts Sally into the same brain state B that Harry is in. In her population, this brain state 
B has the function of tracking yellow. So, according to reductive externalism, she is con-
scious of yellow and has a “yellowish” experience. 
In the second stage, Harry and Sally leave their planets and wind up on middle earth. 
This is when Harry met Sally. Even though they evolved separately and belong to differ-
ent species, they are able to have a baby, Karl. Baby Karl is born without eyes. But he does 
have a complete visual cortex. One day he undergoes brain state B and has a hallucinatory 
color experience. 
On reductive externalism, does Baby Karl’s have a bluish or a yellowish experience? 
Does his brain state B have a biological function of tracking blue or yellow (Figure 1, left)? 
There is no clear answer. In his dad Harry’s population, B has a history of tracking blue. 
But, in his mom Sally’s population, B has a history of tracking yellow.  
Such cases make a dilemma for externalists (described in detail in Pautz 2017). One 
option is radical experiential indeterminacy. In the black-and-white earth case, as Karl views 
the object, it is determinate that he either has a blackish or a reddish experience, but it is 
indeterminate which one, because it is indeterminate whether he “experientially represents” 
the outer black reflectance or the inner red reflectance. Likewise, on middle earth, it is 
determinate that Karl either has a bluish or a yellowish hallucination, but it is indetermi-
nate which one.  
But, whatever we may think of radical indeterminacy in thought and language, radical 
indeterminacy in experiential character is incoherent.  
Another option is arbitrary identities. Presumably, since relations are abundant, there 
is a tracking relation – call it tracking17 – that Karl on black-and-white earth bears to the 
outer black but not the inner red; and there is another tracking relation call it - tracking18 
- that Karl bears to the inner red but not the outer black. Now, maybe it is just a “surd 
metaphysical fact” (Putnam 1981: 46-48) that the conscious-of (“experiential representa-
tion”) relation is determinately identical with tracking17 instead of tracking18, so that it is 
determinate that Karl is consciously acquainted with the outer black rather than the inner 
red. And maybe this same tracking relation is one that Karl on Middle Earth bears to (say) 
yellow rather than blue when having his hallucination. So he has a yellowish experience 
rather a bluish one.  
But the arbitrary identities view flouts the plausible idea that the conscious-of relation 
is a “stand out” relation. That is, when Karl is consciously acquainted with property P (e. 
g. a certain color), but not at all consciously acquainted with property P*, there is a mas-
sive difference in his relation to P and P*. The arbitrary identifies view flouts this because, 
while Karl stands in the tracking17 relation the outer black (which on this view is identical 
with the relation of conscious acquaintance), he stands in the barely different tracking18 
relation to the inner red. On this option, then, there is no way in which the allegedly cor-
rect interpretation (viz. Karl is conscious of the outer black, and misses by a hair acquaint-
ance with the inner red) “stands out” from the allegedly incorrect one (viz. Karl is con-
scious of the inner red, and the outer black is just part of the mediating causal process).  
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In short, the reductive externalist program has difficulty with:  
 
Experiential determinacy. There cannot be radical indeterminacy in the inten-
tional contents of Karl’s experiences. Moreover, the correct assignment of con-
tents to his experiences and experience-based thoughts “stands out” (signifi-
cantly differs) from alternative, incorrect interpretations.   
 
1.2 Problems with the inner sentence theory of belief and desire 
Now suppose that Karl is prelinguistic hominid with simple beliefs and desires. How 
might reductive externalists account for this? 
Many reductive externalists accept Jerry Fodor’s (1990, 2010) inner sentence ap-
proach (“the representational theory of the mind”). Here is the version I will focus on. 
First, although he lacks a language that he can experience, Karl has an “inner” subpersonal 
language that he cannot experience. The sentences of this inner language somehow get 
their contents (that is red, that is round, there is a friend) by way of tracking relations to ex-
ternal items. Once the content of an inner sentence is initially fixed, it tends to retain that 
content, even when it is temporarily severed from its normal connections to perceptual 
inputs and behavioral outputs. (This is required to explain false and irrational beliefs.) 
Second, there is a belief-box and a desire-box. The sufficient conditions for “box-
inclusion” are functional. I will assume that one sufficient condition is this: if subpersonal 
inner sentences b1, b2, . . . and d1, d2, . . . typically interact to cause the actions which, ac-
cording to b1, b2, . . ., will satisfy d1, d2, . . ., then inner sentences b1, b2, . . . are “in the be-
lief-box” and inner sentences d1, d2, . . .  are “in the desire-box”. Call this means-ends. Fi-
nally, to believe that p is to have a subpersonal inner sentence in one’s “belief-box” that 
means that p, and to desire that q is to have a subpersonal inner sentence is one’s “desire-
box” that means that q.  
In my view, this popular reductive externalist approach to belief and desire misses 
some deep connections between Karl’s beliefs and desires and his conscious experiences.  
First, the inner sentence theory violates: 
 
Conscious-life constraint. The beliefs and desires of individuals with conscious ex-
periences cannot “radically change” if there is no change in either (i) their con-
scious experiences and or (ii) their dispositions to consciously act (including inner 
or outer speech dispositions, for individuals with language).   
 
Here’s an example showing why the inner sentence theory violates this. Karl the prelin-
guistic hominid is starving, and he is given vanilla ice-cream for the first time. He believes 
that this white stuff tastes sweet and good and wants this sweet, good-tasting stuff in his 
mouth. He devours it for five minutes. However, in the middle of his chow-down, while 
his experiences and behavior remain the same, his inner sentences are temporally scram-
bled. In particular, the subpersonal sentence “this tastes horribly bitter and disgusting” is 
tokened in his belief-box and “I will have this specific bitter, disgusting stuff in my mouth” is 
tokened in his desire-box. The inner sentence theory implies that, for this short 10-
second interval, Karl suddenly, and for no reason, secretly acquired a new, irrational and 
totally false belief about the ice-cream (it tastes horribly bitter and disgusting) as well as a 
crazy desire (to have this specific disgusting stuff in your mouth). Call this secret scram-
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bling. Against this, throughout Karl evidently believes it tastes good (not disgusting), and 
wants this good stuff in his mouth, even if these mental states are differently realized by 
different, intrinsically-meaningless symbols at the hidden neural level.  
The inner sentence theory also violates the following: 
 
Constitutive experience-belief connection. Experiences do not merely cause beliefs. 
They are necessarily apt to cause beliefs. That is, they are necessarily compelling. 
Necessarily, if Karl experiences clearly different colors, he is at least disposed to 
believe that they are different. If Karl is conscious of a red and round item, he 
is disposed to believe that such an item is present. Necessarily, if Karl has striking 
taste sensation, or a searing pain, he is disposed to believe he is in that state.1  
 
The inner sentence theory violates this because it holds that Karl’s conscious experience of 
a red and round thing is realized by a (iconic) neural representation in one area of his 
brain, while belief that a red and round thing is there is realized by a (discursive, sentence-
like) representation in another area of this brain. Further, the connection between the two 
is utterly contingent, and subject to radical and regular malfunction, like the connection be-
tween having joint pain and believing the weather will change, or between fire and a fire 
alarm. Against this, the experience-belief connection is stronger than that.  
Finally, the inner sentence theory of belief and desire violates:  
 
Prelinguistic limits. (i) If Karl (like a prelinguistic hominid) lacks an outer language 
and is limited to having the usual range of human experiences, then there are 
rough limits on what he can believe and desire. He can have beliefs about percep-
tible properties, the kinds of things in his environment, other people, the near 
past and future, and so on. But he cannot believe propositions about specific 
large numbers, the laws of quantum mechanics, abstract philosophical doctrines, 
and so on. (ii) He can only form such sophisticated beliefs if he has an outer lan-
guage.2  
 
Prelinguistic limits is supported by pretheoretical reflection. Just try to describe possi-
ble circumstances where prelinguistic Karl clearly has such sophisticated beliefs: you can-
not do it. It also fits the facts: humans came to have sophisticated beliefs only by inventing 
a sophisticated outer language. I will provide examples in §§3.2-3.4. 
But prelinguistic limits is puzzling. What explains the necessary restriction on prelin-
guistic Karl’s beliefs and desires? The inner sentence theory doesn’t explain prelinguistic 
limits; in fact, it violates prelinguistic limits because it holds that Karl’s beliefs and desires 
are fixed by his inner language, and in principle there are no limits on how sophisticated it 
 
1 For defenses of a constitutive experience-belief connection, see Byrne 2018: sect. 6.2.10; Hawthorne 2006: 
249-250; Shoemaker 1996: chap. 3; Lewis 1999: 6. 
2 For defences of prelinguistic limits, see Bennett 1976: 96; Bermudez 2003: 150ff;  Blackburn 1984; 137-140; 
Dehaene 1999: chap. 4; Dennett 1987: 201; Hurford 2014: 124; Sacks 1989: chap. 2; Speaks 2010: 234ff; Spelke 
2003; Pinker and Jackendoff 2005: 206; and Wittgenstein 1953: 174ff. I note in passing that the individuals stud-
ied by Varley et al. 2005 who have aphasia but who are capable of mathematical thought are not a counterexam-
ple to prelinguistic limits because they can understand and accept mathematical sentences.  
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might be. On the inner sentence theory, lacking an outer language should be no bar to 
having arbitrarily complex beliefs and desires.   
For instance, pretend that Karl does indeed have something like an inner language. 
Suppose that Karl has a magical subpersonal detector that only does one thing: when 
there is a collection of exactly 167 things just behind his head (where he cannot see any-
thing), it causes the symbol “167 things are behind me” to be tokened in his head. Sup-
pose that this inner sentence then combines with sentences in his desire box to lead to 
rudimentary behavior (for instance, walking forward), so that it satisfies the means-end 
condition for being in the belief-box. The inner sentence model implies that on such oc-
casions Karl believes that there are exactly 167 things behind him. Likewise, there is no 
reason why prelinguistic Karl could not have within his inner language terms that track 
democracies and electrons (Fodor 1990: 111). So inner sentence theory implies that, when 
simple-minded Karl engages in other rudimentary behaviors, he might count as having 
beliefs about democracies or electrons.  
But Karl the prelinguistic hominid evidently does not and (in the circumstances) can-
not have such beliefs. For instance, he doesn’t believe that there are exactly 167 things be-
hind him - he has no idea what is behind him and no available way of thinking about large 
exact numbers.  
 
1.3 A general problem: internalism about experiential intentionality 
In any form, the reductive externalist program holds that all intentionality is grounded in 
“tracking” relations between the brain and the world. In their essay “The Intentionality of 
Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality” (2002), Horgan and Tienson 
used an internalist thesis to argue against the reductive externalist program and for their 
alternative phenomenal intentionality program:  
 
Internalism about experiential intentionality. The phenomenology of experience is 
not determined by tracking relations to the environment; it is internally-
determined. And much intentionality is inseparable from phenomenology.  
 
Horgan and Tienson, like many others, hold experiential internalism to be “self-
evident” from the armchair, not requiring argument (2002: n.23). I disagree. However, 
decades of research in psychophysics and neuroscience support experiential internalism 
(Pautz 2010, 2019). What pains, smells, color qualities, and so on, we experience are fixed 
by internal neural processing, not what external physical properties (types of damage, 
chemical-types, reflectance-types) our sensory systems have the function of tracking. And 
this does indeed rule out the reductive externalist program. Here are some illustrations. 
First, consider a coincidental variation case (Pautz 2010). Karl and Twin Karl’s sensory 
systems have the function of tracking the same types of damage, chemical-types, reflec-
tance-types, and so on, but their internal sensory processing is very different. Given the 
empirically-determined role of the brain, they have radically different experiences. Given 
intentionalism, their experiences, and their experience-based beliefs, differ in content. So 
standard tracking theories (Dretske 1995, Tye 2019, Neander 2017, Williams 2020) fail 
for experiential intentionality.  
The brain-in-the-void (BIV) undermines all reductive externalist theories. Given expe-
riential internalism, an accidental, life-long brain in the void (e. g. a “Blotzmann brain”) 
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undergoing all the same (actual and counterfactual) brain states as Karl would also have all 
the same experiences as Karl. Given intentionalism, the experiences of Karl-the-brain 
would have rich intentional contents, for instance there is a round thing there. And, alt-
hough BIV-Karl doesn’t have the same “wide” beliefs as Karl, it is common-sense that 
BIV-Karl would share many beliefs with Karl - nearly all false in his case (Lewis 1994: 
425). But BIV-Karl would not bear any tracking relations to external states of affairs – for 
instance, the state of affairs of there being a round thing before him (Pautz 2019).  
 
2. PROBLEMS WITH THE PHENOMENAL INTENTIONAITY PROGRAM 
 
The reductive externalist program, then, fails to satisfy several plausible desiderata con-
cerning links between intentionality and phenomenal experience. So let us turn to the 
phenomenal intentionality program.  
Proponents of the phenomenal intentionality program typically accept “internalist in-
tentionalism” about Karl’s sensory-perceptual experiences (Chalmers 2010, Horgan 2014, 
Pautz 2010). The contents of Karl’s experiences are determined by his brain states rather 
than by tracking relations to the environment. Unlike reductive externalism, this view 
satisfies internalism about experiential intentionality. For instance, BIV-Karl will share 
many of Karl’s intentional states. And it may satisfy experiential determinacy. For exam-
ple, on middle earth and black-and-white-earth, the contents of Karl’s experiences, and so 
their phenomenal characters, are determinately pinned down by his brain states.  
As for Karl’s thoughts, friends of phenomenal intentionality accept the cognitive expe-
rience theory. Instead of explaining Karl’s thoughts in terms of hidden inner sentences that 
track external states-of-affairs, they explain his thoughts in terms of special “cognitive ex-
periences”. Cognitive intentionality is “phenomenal intentionality” (Horgan and Tienson 
2002). 
In my view, the phenomenal intentionality program is along the right lines. In fact, I 
will incorporate their “internalist intentionalism” about sensory-perceptual experience 
into my own account in §3. More generally, I think that they are right to emphasize the 
role of conscious experience in determining intentionality. However, in this section, I will 
argue against their simple “cognitive experience theory” of thought. Here we need a more 
complex, multistage story (§3).  
I will first describe the cognitive experience theory in greater detail (§2.1). Then I will 
argue that it violates some important desiderata on a theory of intentionality. It fails to 
adequately explain thought content (§2.2), the holistic character of thought, and prelinguistic 
limits (§2.3). 
 
2.1 The Cognitive Experience Theory of Thought 
In giving an account of how Karl has thoughts with certain contents, we must address 
well-known underdetermination worries due to Quine (1960) and Kripkenstein (1982). 
For example, let the quusg-function be an arithmetical function like the plus-function ex-
cept that it gives weird results for some specific numbers too large for Karl to compute (e. 
g. some specific numbers in the googolplex range). Or suppose that extension of friend* is 
like that of friend in nearly all worlds but that it has a somewhat twisted extension in very 
remote worlds (so that Karl’s finite dispositions are neutral between friend and friend*). 
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How do the physical facts determine that Karl thinks that that 68 plus 57 equals 125 ra-
ther than 68 quusg 57 equals 125, or that Friedrich is a friend rather than a friend*?  
The cognitive experience theory holds that Karl’s thought-contents are constituted by 
special “cognitive experiences”. So the question “how do the physical facts determine the 
contents of Karl’s thoughts?” becomes the question “how do physical facts determine his 
cognitive experiences?” Here are some representative passages:  
 
Something is happening to you experientially as you read. Obviously, there is 
the visual or auditory experience [and] perhaps a rapid and silent process of 
forming acoustic mental images. But there is something else - a certain com-
plex modification of the quality of one’s course of experience, and not just of 
one’s dispositional set. There is understanding-experience. [Its] existence is 
sometimes doubted, perhaps because it has no striking experiential feel in the 
way in which experience in any of the sensory modalities usually does. (Straw-
son 2010: 8) 
 
[Cognitive experience] makes it the case that I can think determinately about 
the number 2 although there is no relevant causal context. Pfff! This is the cor-
rect account of how it is that content can be determinate in spite of all the 
problems raised for this idea by Kripke in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and 
Private Language. (Strawson 2010: 354) 
 
We have no explanation of how the systems of the brain that underlie or realize 
thought give rise to, or involve, conscious thought experience in the way in 
which they do. (Strawson 2010: 255, fn.54) 
 
Certain conscious states are intrinsically such as to ground thought or under-
standing. There is a conscious state which is intrinsically such as to ground the 
thought that two plus two equals four. (Goff 2012: 223) 
 
If consciousness is inside the head, then, in explaining [cognitive] phenomenol-
ogy, we must confine ourselves to facts about what’s going on inside the head; 
to what me and my brain in a vat twin have in common. (Goff 2012: 232) 
 
Physically and apart from phenomenology, there is no “one, determinate, right 
answer” to the question of what is the content of an intentional state. Content 
identity or determinacy is fixed phenomenally. For example, the what-it’s-like 
of thinking “Lo, a rabbit” is different from the what-it’s-like of thinking “Lo, a 
collection of undetached rabbit parts” (Graham, Horgan and Tienson 2007: 
476) 
 
[My view] maintains that the intentional content of a thought is determined by 
its intrinsic phenomenal properties, not its relational properties. My teachers will 
be very disappointed in me. (Pitt 2009: fn.5, my italics)  
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The part of what is thought that is fully determined by [cognitive] phenomenal 
character [is] a kind of thought content. (Siewert 2011: 264) 
 
If there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology, it individuates as finely as con-
tent. (Kriegel 2015: 62) 
 
In sum, the cognitive experience theory holds that, in addition to having sensory-
perceptual experiences, Karl has special cognitive experiences with certain built-in (“narrow”) 
contents. In fact, to have these experiences just is to grasp certain contents (see Pautz 
2013: 209 and Chudnoff 2015: 135). So Karl’s phenomenal life is extremely rich. He has a 
special “democracy” cognitive phenomenology, and a special “plus-function” cognitive 
phenomenology, and so on. Such cognitive experiences are not reducible to sensory-
perceptual experiences. For instance, suppose that Karl has a deaf twin who speaks sign-
language instead of English, and that Karl and his twin are talking about arithmetic or the 
state of democracy. Then they have very different sensory-perceptual experiences. But, if cog-
nitive experiences are irreducible, they presumably might have the very same cognitive ex-
periences.  
The cognitive experience theory has some initial appeal. And it may help to avoid a 
problem we pressed against the inner sentence theory. The inner sentence theory violates 
the conscious-life constraint on belief (§1.2). The cognitive experience theory might ac-
commodate it by holding that to believe that p is to be disposed to the person-level cogni-
tive experience of judging that p (Kriegel 2015, Smithies 2019). And maybe a similar story 
could be given for desire. 
The cognitive experience theory is underdeveloped. What’s the relationship between 
Karl’s cognitive experiences and his physical-functional states? In the case of sensory expe-
riences, two reductive theories have been tried. Behaviorists and functionalists identify 
sensory experiences with functional-dispositional states. Type-type identity theorists identify 
them with categorical brain states. Might either reductive theory work for cognitive experi-
ences?  
There is reason to think not. To illustrate, suppose that Karl has the cognitive experi-
ence with the built-in content that 68 plus 57 equals 125.  
First, cognitive experience theorists would not reduce it to a functional-dispositional 
state involving his dispositions to use “68”, “57” and “plus” in certain ways. For one thing, 
they hold that such dispositions underdetermine whether Karl thinks that 68 plus 57 equals 
125 or 68 quusg 57 equals 125. So Karl’s cognitive experience must be a “further state” 
that picks up the slack when it comes to fixing content. For another thing, Karl’s cognitive 
experience is supposed to be a categorical state that explains Karl’s dispositions to use lan-
guage.  
So perhaps Karl’s cognitive experience that 68 plus 57 equals 125 is simply identical 
with his categorical brain state – type-type identity theory. But a simple Leibniz’s law ar-
gument rules this out too. On the cognitive experience theory, it is part of the essence of 
this cognitive experience that it is true iff 68 plus 57 equals 125.3 By contrast, this is not 
part of the essence of any brain state. For any brain state can be fully characterized in 
 
3 This doesn’t presuppose that this intentional state is a “relation to a proposition”. So it is compatible with the 
nonrelational theory of intentionality defended by Prior (1968: 93ff) and Kriegel (2011: chap.3). 
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terms of types of neurons and the times, directions and intensities at which they fire, without 
mentioning numbers or the plus-function. Therefore, the property of having a cognitive 
experience with certain built-in truth-conditions is distinct from (though it might be real-
ized by) the property of undergoing a neural pattern.  
So the cognitive experience theory naturally leads to the further fact view of thought. 
Some of Karl’s thoughts, with their built-in contents, are not reducible in other terms. 
They are “further facts”. This answers Quine and Kripkenstein. Of course, since every-
thing depends on the physical, such facts depend on the physical facts about Karl (e. g. his 
brain states). But it’s dependence without reduction. On a dualist version of the further 
fact view, the dependence is underwritten by contingent psychophysical laws. On a “physi-
calist” version, it is underwritten by metaphysically necessary “grounding laws” (more on 
this in the next subsection). I will assume that the cognitive experience theory is a further 
fact view.  
Here is another question. On the cognitive experience theory, some thoughts and epi-
sodes of understanding are irreducible cognitive experiences. But which ones? Call this the 
scope question. Maybe it applies only to primitive thoughts with very simple contents closely 
related to perception (Mendelovici 2018). Then a different story is required for more so-
phisticated thoughts. But, in fact, proponents of the cognitive experience theory typically 
apply it to quite sophisticated thoughts: thinking that 68 plus 57 equals 125, that he’s a 
friend, that democracy is in trouble, and so on. This “rich view” fits with the above quota-
tions. It will be my target.  
 
2.2 Against the Cognitive Experience Theory: Danglers 
I don’t think that there really are cognitive experiences with built-in phenomenal contents 
like 68 plus 57 equals 125 or democracy is in trouble. My first argument against the cognitive 
experience theory is that it leads to an incredible account of content.  
For instance, on the cognitive experience theory, Karl’s “cognitive experience” consti-
tutes his thinking (and understanding the sentence as meaning) that 68 plus 57 equals 125 
rather than that 68 quusg 57 equals 125. We saw in the previous section that Karl’s cogni-
tive experience must be distinct from his standard physical-functional states. Still, it is cer-
tainly somehow dependent on them: mental changes always depend on underlying purely 
physical changes. But which ones? One odd view would be that Karl’s having the specific 
cognitive experience that 68 plus 57 equals 125 at this time, rather than some other cogni-
tive experience, is somehow dependent on his set of dispositions to use “68”, “57” and “plus” 
at that time. But, again, proponents of cognitive experience hold that such functional-
dispositional states underdetermine content. 
The only option remaining is the brain-based explanation: Karl’s cognitive experiences 
depend on his brain states, even though they are distinct from those brain states. Strawson 
and Goff endorse something like it in the quotations above.  
The brain-based theory requires “intentional laws” linking brain states and thought-
contents, for instance:  
 
If Karl undergoes so-and-so brain state, then he has the cognitive experience 
that 68 plus 57 equals 125 (rather a cognitive experience that 68 quusg 57 
equals 125).  
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If Karl undergoes such-and-such brain state, then he has the cognitive experi-
ence that someone is his friend (rather than a cognitive experience that some-
one is his friend*).  
 
These special laws are what “solve” the underdetermination worries due to Quine and 
Kripkenstein. Given the rich variety of possible cognitive experiences, they must be ex-
tremely numerous. Given the further fact view, they are brute “necessary connections be-
tween distinct existences”. On a dualist version, they are contingent (Graham, Horgan and 
Tienson 2007: 476). On a physicalist version, they are metaphysically necessary “ground-
ing laws” (Rosen 2010: 132).  
The brain-based theory is unorthodox. A standard explanation of why Karl thinks that 
68 plus 57 equals 125, rather than that 68 quusg 57 equals 125, appeals to (i) how he’s dis-
posed to use certain (inner or outer) symbols together with (ii) considerations of “natural-
ness” (e. g. Lewis 1992). By contrast, the brain-based theory holds that Karl simply has a 
categorical cognitive experience with the built-in content 68 plus 57 equals 125. And this in 
turn is directly explained by nothing but his here-and-now brain state (embedded in a net-
work of such states) together with a special “intentional law”.  
Still, the brain-based theory is not unprecedented. John Searle has endorsed such a 
view: 
 
Intrinsic intentional phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes 
going on in the brain, and they occur in and are realized in the structure of the 
brain [although] we do not know much about the details of how such things as 
neuron firings at synapses cause [intentional phenomena] (Searle 1984: 5-6) 
 
Although they neglect the issue, I have argued that friends of cognitive experiences 
(Kriegel, Siewert, Pitt, etc.) are led to the same theory, requiring special “intentional 
laws”. But I will now argue that this theory is incredible, for a few reasons.  
First, J. C. Smart (1959) objected to the complexity of brute “dangling laws” connect-
ing brain states with distinct sensory-perceptual experiences. The brain-based cognitive 
experience theory is even more complex, requiring a slew of additional “danglers”: special 
(nomic or grounding) laws connecting brain states with distinct cognitive experiences with 
certain built-in contents.  
Second, these intentional laws will be arbitrary. What matters to experience are pat-
terns of neural activity. But the connection between undergoing any pattern of neural ac-
tivity and the thought (“cognitive experience”) that 68 plus (rather than quusg) 57 equals 
125 is bound to be arbitrary.  
Third, while some of Karl’s thoughts have quite determinate contents, others have in-
determinate contents. For instance, when Karl thinks that 68 plus 57 equals 125, the con-
tent is perfectly precise and determinate (at least if numbers are unique Platonic objects 
rather than set-theoretic constructions). By contrast, when he thinks democracy is in trou-
ble, the content is quite indeterminate. We need to explain indeterminacy no less than 
determinacy. How can the brain-based cognitive experience theory explain it? One idea 
(suggested to me by Philip Goff) is that, while some brain states produce cognitive experi-
ences that have built-in determinate contents, other brain states produce cognitive experi-
ences with built-in indeterminate contents. To use Siewert’s (2011: 264) language, “the part 
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of what is thought that is fully determined by phenomenal character” is determinate in the 
one case, and indeterminate in the other. There is nothing more to say. However, I cannot 
accept that. Surely there is a more illuminating explanation – for example, one appealing 
to differences in “use plus naturalness” (§3.4).  
In sum, the cognitive experience theory leads to the brain-based theory of cognitive 
intentionality, but that theory is incredible. It violates a plausible desideratum: 
 
Minimize danglers. In explaining the determinacy (and the indeterminacy) of 
Karl’s thoughts, we should minimize brute “necessary connections” between 
Karl’s physical states and his distinct intentional states.  
 
2.3 Against the Cognitive Experience Theory: Holism  
My next problem for the cognitive experience theory concerns the generally accepted the-
sis of holism about thought: 
 
Holism. There are rough, metaphysically necessary connections between Karl’s 
having a certain thought (e. g. the thought that there is a giant red cube there, 
the thought that someone is a bachelor, or the thought that 68 plus 57 equals 
125) and other things, including perhaps: having the capacity for certain senso-
ry-perceptual experiences, having certain inferential dispositions, having cer-
tain dispositions to try do certain things (given certain desires), having certain 
background linguistic or conceptual abilities, and so on.  
 
Elsewhere I posed a dilemma (Pautz 2010: 366 and 2013: 214ff). Cognitive experience 
theorists can either reject or accept holism. Either way, I argued, they face serious prob-
lems.  
In response, Philip Goff (2018) and Uriah Kriegel (2015) reject holism. Instead, they 
accept “atomism” or “modal independence” for cognitive experiences and so also for 
thoughts. By contrast, Michelle Montague (2019) and Charles Siewert (2016: sect. 6) ac-
cept holism. I want to look at their responses.  
Let us start with rejecting holism. In fact, cognitive experience theorists are under pres-
sure to take this horn. Typically, distinct existences are freely recombinable. So if Karl’s 
thoughts are really special experiential states that are distinct from all other mental states, 
and if they are not to be explained in terms of his language-use or dispositions, shouldn’t 
they be modally independent from all these things, contrary to holism?  
The problem with an atomistic cognitive experience theory is that it implies the possi-
bility “thought scrambling” and “punctate minds”. Let us take these in turn.  
Thought Scrambling. Karl is a prelinguistic hominid who has a perceptual experience of 
a rock flying towards him which an enemy tribesman has thrown at him. On the cognitive 
experience theory, Karl presumably undergoes a second, quite different cognitive experi-
ence t26 which constitutes his judging that something is moving towards him. That is, there 
is a peculiar redundancy. Now suppose later he has an identical perceptual experience of 
another rock flying towards him (he’s having a bad day). Given atomism, on this occasion, 
the cognitive experience t26 might be replaced by another cognitive experience t81 which 
constitutes judging that there is nothing but a stationary giant cube sphere in front of me. Still, 
everything else might be the same: he has nothing but a vivid, clear-as-day visual experi-
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ence of a rock moving towards his head, he is afraid, he wants to avoid being hit, and he 
moves away as a result. There is also no change in his inner speech, since he is a prelin-
guistic hominid who lacks language and inner speech. Indeed, since cognitive experience is 
supposed be subtle (otherwise it would be uncontroversial), Karl might not even notice that 
t26 has been replaced by t81. Despite all this, proponents of an atomistic cognitive experi-
ence theory must say that, on the second occasion, when Karl has a vivid, clear-as-day ex-
perience of a giant rock headed towards him and so quickly moves away, he is “really” se-
cretly judging that there is nothing but a stationary giant red cube in front of me.  
Given atomism, the cognitive experience theory also implies that the following could 
happen. Karl is a modern human with language. Whenever he sees a female fox and says 
“That is a vixen”, he “really” has the cognitive experience that it is bachelor. But, because 
he is screwed up in another way, this causes him to have the cognitive experience that it is 
a fox and the cognitive experience that it is female. And if someone asks him what kind of 
thing he thinks is in front of him, he points to other female foxes around. So his visual expe-
rience, his speech, his inferential dispositions, his pointing behavior, and his behavioral 
dispositions are exactly as if they would be for someone who believes that it is female fox. 
Still, an atomistic cognitive experience theory absurdly implies Karl has a deeply secret 
and super irrational belief that the perceived fox is a bachelor.  
Or suppose that, on one solitary occasion, when Karl says “2 plus 2 equals 4”, instead 
of having cognitive experience that 68 plus 57 is 125, he has the different cognitive experi-
ence that 68 quusg 57 is 125. (Why couldn’t there be such a cognitive experience?) Howev-
er, suppose that there is no difference in his other “cognitive experiences”, in his use of the 
mathematical term “plus” in any possible circumstances, and so on. On the cognitive expe-
rience (“further fact”) theory, on this occasion Karl secretly thinks 68 quusg 57 is 125 ra-
ther than 68 plus 57 equals 125.  
Goff (2018: 103-104) holds that these “thought scrambling” cases are indeed meta-
physically possible. He says that the only reason we might think otherwise is that they are 
nomically impossible and difficult to imagine. I disagree. Thoughts cannot float free from 
everything else in this way. And I’m not really thinking that these cases are only nomically 
impossible and confusing this for metaphysical impossibility.4   
How do settle the issue? Here are a few points in my favor. First, you cannot conceive 
of such thought-scrambling from the first person. Second, the atomistic cognitive experi-
ence theory leads to an absurd form of skepticism. Suppose you say “68+57=125”. Maybe 
you can know that you are having THIS cognitive experience; but how can you be so sure 
that THIS cognitive experience is a one that determines a plus-content rather one that 
determines a quusg-content, as in the above “scrambling” case? Third, if we follow Goff 
 
4 Uriah Kriegel has suggested to me a response that goes beyond Goff’s. In line with atomism, he accepts the 
metaphysical possibility of the “thought scrambling” cases described in the text. For instance, there is a possible 
case in which, thanks to the momentary insertion of an aberrant “cognitive experience”, Karl the prelinguistic 
hominid, while experiencing a rock flying towards him, has a secret and causally isolated cognitive experience 
that there is nothing but a giant red sphere before me, which leaves absolutely no trace on the rest of his mental life 
(visual experiences, imagery, inner speech) or on his dispositions to act. But he adds that in such a case there is 
also a sense in which Karl believes the obvious - that there is a rock headed towards him - where that sense is 
given by something like the holistic “interpretation theory” I will propose in §3.2. This mixed view is interest-
ing. But it still allows for atomistic “thought scrambling” – arbitrary thought insertions that leave no traces. And 
I find that impossible.  
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and take the permissive line that such cases are possible but just difficult to imagine, we are 
led to a general modal skepticism. For instance, why not say that round squares are possi-
ble but just difficult to imagine? 
Punctate Minds. Suppose now that Karl is a disembodied brain-in-the-void (BIV). BIV 
only has the brain state sufficient for a single cognitive experience, namely, the that alleg-
edly constitutes thinking that 68 plus 57 equals 125. BIV just has a little experience-
nugget. BIV has no other neural machinery. So BIV is not having, and indeed could not 
have, experiences of a number of things (e. g. two marbles or three musical notes, etc.). 
BIV also has no language or inner speech (including arithmetical language).  
Goff (2018: 103-104) and Kriegel (2015: 54ff) hold that such a punctate mind is possi-
ble, as required by their atomism. But I find it a priori impossible.5 Here is a simple argu-
ment for my take (Pautz 2013: 213). To think that 68 plus 57 equals 125, you need con-
cepts of numbers. And, to have concepts of numbers, you need to be at least capable of hav-
ing experiences of a number of things (they could be non-veridical experiences or even 
imagistic experiences). But presumably Goff and Kriegel don’t think that the cognitive 
experience that 68 plus 57 equals 125 is itself such an experience (e. g. it is not a visual im-
age of 125 things). And, by stipulation, the BIV has only this single experience, and is not 
even capable of having any other experiences. So, it cannot have concepts like 68, 57, plus, 
and 125. Therefore, it cannot have such a thought.6  
Let us then turn to the second option for friends of cognitive experiences. Instead of 
rejecting holism, they might try to accommodate it within their theory.  
Montague (2019: 195-199) opts for this horn. On her view, thoughts are cognitive ex-
periences that are wholly distinct from each other, from dispositions to try to act, and so 
on. Nevertheless, they are necessarily connected with each other, and with dispositions to 
try to act, and so on. So, like me, she thinks that the above-described “scrambling cases” 
are impossible. And maybe the bad-off BIV couldn’t have a solitary cognitive experience 
that 68 plus 57 equal 125 because it doesn’t satisfy certain complex pre-conditions for hav-
ing this experience, as Siewert (2016: section 6 and 1998: 285) suggests.  
Now Montague and Siewert are right to accept holism.7 But they neglect to address a 
few arguments against combining holism with their cognitive experience theory. 
First, the missing explanation argument (Pautz 2013: 215-216; Chudnoff 2015: 120). 
Given the cognitive experience theory, we cannot explain holism. We simply must say, as 
Montague and Siewert do, that, while some experiences (e. g. color experiences) are not 
necessarily connected with dispositions to act or infer in certain ways, other experiences 
 
5 The atomistic cognitive experience theory also makes a false empirical prediction. The theory says that the same 
cognitive experiences that we have – for instance the cognitive experience that 68 plus 57 equals 125 – could 
occur in splendid isolation in the absence of capacities for inner or outer speech (as happens in the BIV). But, 
presumably, since I’m in control of my thought, I’m in control of my cognitive experiences. So this view predicts 
that right now I could now close my eyes and choose to have the isolated cognitive experience (and hence 
thought) that 68 plus 57 equals 125, in the absence of inner or outer speech (“68 plus 57 equals 125”). But I cannot 
do that.  
6 Kriegel (2015: 57) responds to this argument by retreating to a different case in which the punctate mind ac-
quired arithmetical concepts by having had sensory-perceptual experiences of numbers of things in the past. But 
his atomism implies the possibility of the more extreme case described in the text in which a BIV system has a 
single arithmetical thought without ever having had for experiences of numbers of things and indeed without even 
having the capacity for such experiences. And I argue that this case is impossible.  
7 Horgan and Tienson (2002: 526; and unpublished ms) also take the holist horn.  
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(“cognitive experiences”) are in necessarily connected with rich dispositions of this kind. 
Moreover, all these specific necessary connections have no deeper explanation.8 This is 
unexplanatory and complicated.   
Second, Montague and Siewert’s combination of the cognitive experience theory and 
holism faces the argument from very distinct existences. Take the thought 68 plus 57 makes 
125. Given the cognitive experience theory, this is constituted by a special cognitive expe-
rience E. Further, E is not itself an (e. g. an imagistic) experience N of any number of 
things (much less 125 things). It is totally different from any experience of a number of 
things. Now, given a plausible form of holism, it’s metaphysically necessary that, if a sub-
ject has thought 68 plus 57 makes 125, they are capable of having experiences of numbers 
of things (otherwise the subject cannot have arithmetical concepts). Thus, the cognitive 
experience theory and holism imply the following: it’s metaphysically necessary that, if a 
subject purely cognitive experience E, the subject must have had or be capable of having a 
totally different experience N of a number of things. But it is a priori implausible that 
there is a metaphysically necessary connection between such very different types of expe-
riences. Holism sits poorly with the cognitive experience theory of thought. 
Third, the argument from prelinguistic limits. In §1, we noted that Karl is only capable 
of a limited range of thought without language. Thought beyond that range requires hav-
ing an outer language – a compositional system of representation. This is a holistic con-
nection, broadly understood. It cries out for explanation. We saw that the inner sentence 
theory of thought fails to explain it (§1.2). The cognitive experience theory also fails to 
explain it. In general, experience doesn’t require language. So if thoughts are special ex-
periences, shouldn’t we be capable of any thought without language? For instance, 
couldn’t a neuroscientist manipulate the brain states of prelinguistic Karl, so that he mo-
mentarily has cognitive experience that 68 plus 57 equals 125, or the cognitive experienc-
es you in fact have as you read the Declaration of Independence, without language being 
involved?  
One response is that cognitive experience is “perceiving as”, in particular, perceiving 
a sentence as meaning that p. So Karl cannot have the relevant cognitive experiences with-
out language.  
But there are two problems with this proposal. First, some thought is possible without 
language. Think of prelinguistic children, or Karl as a prelinguistic hominid (§1.2). So 
some limited range of cognitive experiences must be possible without language (Siewert 
1998: 277-278). So the proposal needs revision: some cognitive experiences are possible 
without language, but for some reason more sophisticated cognitive experiences (advanced 
math, the Declaration of Independence, complex physics, etc.) essentially involve lan-
guage. But this doesn’t explain prelinguistic limits.  
Second, if we have a cognitive experience with the complex content that the sentence 
“68 plus 57 equals 125” means that 68 plus 57 equals 125, we should in principle be able to 
have a cognitive experience with the simpler content that 68 plus 57 equals 125. (Compare: 
if you experience that there is red thing next to green thing, you can experience the simpler 
 
8 Pace Chudnoff (2015: 121), the general thesis of phenomenal holism (“no two partial phenomenal states can be 
the same if they belong to different total phenomenal states”) is logically two weak to entail and explain all the 
specific and varied holistic-inferential connections that must obtain between cognitive experiences (“there is a 
bachelor”, “68 plus 57 equals 125”), other cognitive experiences, sensory experiences, and behavioral dispositions.  
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content that there is a green thing.) In that case, prelinguistic Karl should in principle be 
capable of having a cognitive experience in which he directly “grasps” this complex math-
ematical content without linguistic mediation, against prelinguistic limits.  
 
2.4 Is Cognitive Experience Theory Supported by Introspection? 
In sum, the cognitive experience leads to brute laws (“danglers”) connecting Karl’s brain 
states with sensible rather than twisted intentional contents (§2.2). And it doesn’t fit well 
with the basic “data” about thought, namely, holism and prelinguistic limits (§2.3).  
However, it might be replied that we are stuck with the cognitive experience theory 
because it is introspectively evident. For instance, suppose you read “2 plus 2 equals 4” or 
“democracy is in trouble”. You understand what is said in a flash. Intuitively, no one could 
be in the same total phenomenal state as you without understanding the words as meaning 
that 2 plus 2 equals 4 and democracy is in trouble. The experiential state of grasping the 
meanings of these familiar words is the categorical ground of your disposition to provide 
certain answers to questions about their meaning and use. Since your sensory-experiential 
experiences are insufficient for grasping these contents, experiences of grasping them must 
be special, further experiences. If we didn’t have such experiences, reading would be bor-
ing.   
But there are two problems with the appeal to introspection. First, consider the fol-
lowing continuum argument. You read mathematical sentences of increasing complexity (“2 
is greater than 1”, “2+2=4”, etc.). Eventually you get to ones involving very large numbers, 
imaginary numbers, more sophisticated mathematical functions, and so on. Let us stipulate 
that, by ordinary standards, you count as “understanding” all the sentences in the series: 
after all, you understand the constituent expressions, you understand the Arabic number 
notation, you understand the mathematical functions, and so on. That is, you are disposed 
to give correct answers (maybe with some effort) when asked to explain what they mean. 
Now, cognitive experience theorists hold that early in the sequence (e. g. “2 is greater than 
1”, “2+2=4”) you have, over and above your sensory-perceptual experiences of the sentenc-
es and your dispositions to explain them, categorical cognitive experiences which consist in 
“grasping” or “seeing” the precise mathematical contents of the sentences. But, presuma-
bly, they will say that, eventually, when the sentences become longer and more abstract, 
you do not have such categorical cognitive experiences which consist in grasping the pre-
cise mathematical contents of the sentences. For surely your cognitive experiences are just 
not that rich and fine-grained. If these sentences had had slightly different meanings in 
English, you’re here-and-now experience of reading them would have been the same. In 
these more abstract cases, you only have sensory-perceptual experiences of the words and 
certain dispositions to use and explain them. (That is, their view of such cases resembles 
the view opponents of cognitive experiences like myself would apply to all sentences in the 
series, even the initial basic ones.) If so, there must be an answer to the “scope question” 
(§2.1): where in the series of sentences did you stop having cognitive experiences in which 
you grasped the precise mathematical content of the sentence? No answer stands out as 
clearly correct (including “it’s indeterminate but hereabouts”). This is very odd if we can 
know by introspection when our experiential state determines that we understand certain 
contents.  
Second, I suggest that we can explain away the introspective appeal of the cognitive 
experience theory.  
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To see how, let us start with another case. Suppose you enter a room and see a few 
familiar friends. At first blush, you could not be in the same total experiential state and yet 
fail to know who they are. But, on second thought, this is not the case. In principle, you 
could have the very same total experiential state (with the same sense of familiarity) but 
without really having any idea who they are. The reason you might think otherwise is that 
in the actual situation information about who they are is easily available. You can easily 
open up a dossier of information about any one of them. So you might mistakenly think 
that all that information is somehow already “there”, part of your total experience.  
Likewise, when you read “democracy is in trouble”, you could easily unpack what 
these words mean. I suggest that this explains away the appeal of cognitive experience the-
ory. It explains why you might think that all that information is somehow already there and 
part of your experience. But this is an illusion. Seeing familiar words is like seeing old 
friends. And just as you could have the same total experience of your friends but not really 
know who they are, so you could have the same total experience of the words “democracy 
is in trouble” but not really know what they mean. Indeed, you might fail to understand 
them as meaning anything at all and have no idea how to use or define them. For you 
might have the same total experience of the words but utterly fail to satisfy the functional-
dispositional requirements on understanding them as meaning anything (Putnam 1981: 
4ff; Pautz 2013: 213; Chudnoff 2015: 147). Of course, you typically “just know” in the 
moment that you understand the words as meaning something. But, contrary to the cogni-
tive experience theory of thinking and understanding, your total experience in the moment 
itself doesn’t entail that you understand them as meaning something.  
 
3. OUTLINE OF A MULTISTAGE THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY 
 
In the course of criticizing the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal inten-
tionality program, I laid out several desiderata. For instance, the contents of Karl’s senso-
ry-perceptual experiences are internally-determined. His beliefs and desires are connected 
to his conscious-life. We need to explain the determinacy (and indeterminacy) of thought-
content. There are necessary limits to his prelinguistic thought and holistic constraints on 
his thoughts. Neither the reductive externalist program nor the phenomenal intentionali-
ty program adequately accommodates all these desiderata.   
I will now outline a multistage theory of intentionality satisfying all the desiderata. 
Like friends of phenomenal intentionality, I will defend internalist intentionalism for 
Karl’s sensory-perceptual experiences. And I will suggest that his conscious experiences 
play a crucial role in grounding determinate intentionality. But, like reductive externalists, 
I will suggest we need a real explanation of the contents of Karl’s thoughts. We cannot 
just say “cognitive experiences do it”. My explanation will co-opt some elements of Lew-
is’s account of Karl: his “interpretationism” about Karl’s beliefs and desires (1974) and his 
appeal to “naturalness” (1992).  
In outlining my theory, I will pretend that Karl’s life spans human history. Diagram-








Figure 2: a multistage theory of intentionality 
 
3.1 Stage One: Karl’s Conscious Experiences with Thin Contents 
My multistage theory begins with a view associated with the phenomenal intentionality 
program: an internalist and nonreductive form of intentionalism about Karl’s sensory-
perceptual experiences, as opposed to the reductive externalism form of intentionalism 
criticized in §1.  
The quickest way to get a hold of this view is to compare it to the sense datum view 
defended by Russell in The Problems of Philosophy (1912). Suppose Karl views a tomato. On 
Russell’s view, the physical tomato is intrinsically colorless. Karl’s brain generates a red-
dish and round sense datum, and Karl bears a special relation of conscious acquaintance to 
this sense datum. The internalist form of intentionalism I favor is similar, but without 
sense data. It replaces sense data with states of affairs that may or may not obtain. Because 
of Karl’s neural processing, Karl stand in a special, irreducible relation – the conscious-of 
relation – to the ostensible state of affairs of something being reddish and round. In illu-
sion and hallucination, the state of affairs doesn’t obtain. It seems to Karl that there is a 
sense datum but there really isn’t one.  
Here is a quick argument for this view (Pautz 2019). Given experiential internalism, 
BIV-Karl (§1.3) might have the same tomato-like experience as Karl. Thus, BIV-Karl 
might be conscious of (“experientially represent”) the (uninstantiated) property of being 
round. But BIV-Karl's brain state does not have the function of tracking (being produced 
by) that spatial property. Indeed, BIV-Karl bears no interesting physical relation whatever 
to the property. So the conscious-of relation (the “experiential representation relation”) is 
not identical with any physical relation. As Ned Block (2019: 426) says, it appears that “we 
internalists should acknowledge an irreducible representation relation”.   
So the picture is one of grounding without reduction. Somehow, Karl’s brain states 
ground his being conscious of various states of affairs, but the conscious-of relation is not 
reducible to any tracking or other physical relation. On a dualist version (Levine 2019), 
these “grounding” connections are contingent. On a physicalist version (Rosen 2010: 
132), they are metaphysically necessary. I’m neutral here.  
Internalist intentionalism is consistent with both “illusionism” about the traditional 
secondary qualities and also with “realism”. On a realist version (McGinn 1996), physical 
things acquired colors-as-we-see-them when they came to habitually cause us to have expe-
riences of those colors; the colors of things co-evolved with color experiences. On an illu-
sionist form (Chalmers 2010, Horgan 2014, Pautz 2010), this is not so. Physical surfaces 
don’t have colors-as-we-see them.  
Karl also has experiences of acting. These, too, have built-in contents. These contents 
might have the form: I’m making so-and-so happen (Bayne and Levy 2006).  
There is a debate about whether the built-in “phenomenal contents” of our experi-
ences “thin” or “rich”. In §2, I denied that Karl has special “cognitive experiences” with 
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built in rich contents involving democracy and large exact numbers. For reasons I cannot 
go into here (but see Byrne and Siegel 2017), I also reject a “rich” view of Karl’s sensory-
perceptual experiences on which their phenomenal contents involve high-level properties 
like being a tomato, being edible, expressing fear, or being wrong. Rather, they only involve 
colors, shapes, movement, and gestalts (abstract complexes of shapes-sizes-colors). Like-
wise the phenomenal contents of his pains, pleasures, and emotional experiences only concern 
bodily qualities.  
Karl’s conscious experiences are a source of reasons. On Pryor’s “dogmatism” (2000), 
if Karl is conscious of ostensible state of affairs p, then he thereby has a basic prima facie 
reason to believe that p. Karl’s experience-based reasons extend beyond the thin contents 
of his experiences. For instance, his history of experiences provides a reason to think all 
emeralds are green (rather than grue). Karl’s conscious experiences are also source of rea-
sons for desire. For instance, if Karl has a severe pain, he has a basic reason to desire that 
it go away.  
In sum, Karl starts with experiences with relatively thin contents. The next stages of 
my account propose “extension mechanisms” whereby Karl might move to beliefs, desires, 
and other intentional states with richer contents.  
 
3.2 Stage Two: Karl’s Beliefs-Desires within the Perceptual Circle 
Imagine that Karl still lacks an outer language. Nevertheless, he has certain basic beliefs 
and desires. The second stage is a theory of them: 
 
Best systems theory: If, given his history of conscious experiences and consequent 
dispositions to act, all the best interpretations assign to Karl the belief that p or the 
desire that q, then this grounds Karl having the belief that p or the desire that q. 
 
To a first approximation, the best systems do the best job overall of maximizing Karl’s 
rationality given his dispositions to act and his conscious experiences.  
This account is inspired by Lewis’s account in “Radical Interpretation” (1974). It is 
often called “interpretationist”. But this term suggests instrumentalism. So I prefer “best 
systems theory”.9   
Let us consider an example. Return to the example where a rock is flying towards 
Karl and so he intentionally moves away (§2.3). Infinitely-many perverse interpretations 
fit Karl’s behavior. One of them is that he believes (despite experiencing otherwise) that 
the rock is moving away, that he wants to be hit on the head, and he believes that by mov-
ing away he will magically cause the rock to reverse direction and hit his head. What 
makes such perverse interpretations incorrect? This is an “underdetermination worry” not 
unlike those of Quine (1960) and Kripkenstein (1982).  
Lewis (e. g. 1986: 38ff; 1994: 427ff) provides an elegant solution. Given his experi-
ence as of rock headed towards him, Karl’s has a reason to believe that a rock is headed 
towards him. In addition, the desire to be hit on the head is unreasonable. So the above 
perverse interpretation gratuitously portrays Karl as massively departing from rationality. 
The interpretation that has Karl departing least from rationality assigns to him the belief 
that a rock is headed towards his head and a desire that it not hit his head. This is what 
 
9 For further defense of development of this view, see also Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 2007: chap. 11.  
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singles it out as the correct interpretation. Call this the reasons-based solution to the under-
determination problem.  
In general, if we are to avoid underdetermination, we cannot say that the best systems 
are just a matter of best “fitting the subject’s behavior”, as on behaviorism. Rather, we 
must define them as the systems that achieve an optimal balance of maximizing Karl’s sub-
stantive rationality (responding to experience-based reasons) as well as his structural rationality 
(behaving so as to maximize expected utility, coherence, etc.). That is, prelinguistic Karl’s 
beliefs and desires fixed jointly by his behavioral dispositions on the output side and by the 
reasons provided by his sensory-perceptual experiences on the input side.10 Karl’s con-
scious experiences (the first stage) are explanatorily (but not temporally) prior to his basic 
beliefs and desires.11  
Since I am no skeptic, I think that Karl’s experiences provide him with basic reasons 
to believe things that somewhat extend beyond the thin contents of his experiences, for 
instance that all emeralds are blue (rather than grue). This explains how prelinguistic Karl 
can determinately believe such things.  
When prelinguistic Karl’s dispositions to act become regularly inharmonious with his 
history of experiences (e. g. he is mentally ill), the best systems theory will assign him be-
liefs contrary to experiential evidence. The point is that correct interpretations minimize 
irrationality, not that they impute no irrationality.  
The best systems theory is incomplete. It provides a recipe for determining prelin-
guistic Karl’s beliefs and desires given a foundation: a rich set of facts involving his con-
scious experiences, his actions, and his reasons, all of which must be explanatory prior to his 
beliefs and desires. So best systems theorists must address the following three questions.  
First, what determines Karl’s conscious experiences? Given intentionalism about experi-
ence, this is a special case of the hard problem of intentionality. Call it the problem of 
source intentionality.  
Second, what distinguishes Karl’s actions (which are up for rationalization in terms of 
belief-desire) from his “mere bodily movements” (which are not). Defining actions as 
movements that are nondeviantly caused by Karl’s desires or beliefs would lead to circular-
ity, since his desires and beliefs are precisely what the best systems theory is trying to ex-
plain.  
Third, where do Karl’s reasons come from? The best systems theory is up to its ears in 
normativity. It appeals to facts like “given so-and-so experiences, Karl has a reason to be-
lieve p”, “so-and-so prior probabilities are rational”, “Karl has a basic reason to desire so-
and-so intrinsic values”, “failing to maximizing expected utility is irrational”, and so on. It 
is very difficult to provide a plausible (not list-like) reductive account of such notions. 
These questions constitute the source problem for Lewis’s best systems theory (Pautz 
2013, Williams 2020). Different versions of the best systems theory result when we plug 
in different answers.  
 
10 This counts against Schwitzgebel’s (2002: 269) claim that “what is for a subject to believe something does not 
require appeal beyond the subject’s forward-looking [output-side] dispositions”. 
11 If behavioral duplicates of Karl that work by huge input-output “look-up tables” (“blockheads”, “marionettes”) 
lack conscious experiences, my consciousness-based best systems theory can avoid the mistaken verdict that they 
have the same beliefs and desires as Karl. I can also appeal to the constraint proposed by Braddon-Mitchell and 
Jackson 2007: 120-122.  
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In Stage One, I advanced nonreductive internalist intentionalism about experience. 
When we plug this into the best systems theory, we obtain:  
 
Nonreductive internalist best systems theory. The best systems theory combined 
with nonreductive internalist intentionalism about conscious experience 
(Chalmers 2010, Horgan 2014, Pautz 2010). A crucial source of intentionality 
is an irreducible relation of conscious acquaintance.   
 
Therefore, in answer to the question of what determines Karl’s conscious experiences, 
I hold with Russell (1912) that they involve an irreducible, internally-determined relation 
of conscious acquaintance with ostensible states of affairs. So, while Karl’s beliefs and de-
sires reduce to facts about his conscious experiences and dispositions to act, these facts 
cannot in turn be reduced to the austere physical facts about Karl.  
In answer to the question of where prelinguistic Karl’s reasons come from, I advocate 
dogmatism (Pryor 2000). Karl’s reasons come from what ostensible states of affairs he is 
conscious of. And I am not especially concerned to reduce facts about reasons and ration-
ality to something more basic.  
In answer to the question of how to define Karl’s actions, I suggest that they can be 
picked out prior to his beliefs and desires, thereby avoiding the above-mentioned circular-
ity worry: they are the doings that he experientially represents himself as making happen 
(Bayne and Levy 2006).  
Of course, the best systems theory comes in other forms. Lewis (1974, 1994) himself 
hoped for a fully reductive form of the best systems theory according to which all these 
facts about Karl ultimately reduce to the austere physical facts about him. But he never 
provided the details.12 In this essay, I’m assuming intentionalism about experience. The 
only well-developed reductive theories of experiential intentionality are externalist. So 
reductive best systems theorists are led to:  
 
Reductive externalist best systems theory. The best systems theory combined with 
externalist intentionalism about experience (Dretske 1995, Tye 2019). A crucial 
source of intentionality is a tracking relation between Karl’s brain states and 
the world.  
 
In his recent book The Metaphysics of Representation (2020), Williams defends a best 
systems theory along these lines. In particular, he favors a teleological tracking theory 
(Neander 2017). For instance, suppose Karl views a tomato. Karl is in a brain state that 
has the biological function of tracking a round thing with a red-reflectance. On Williams’ 
view, this “tracking” fact constitutes his experientially representing that a round and red 
thing is there (2020: 185ff). This is part of his evidence and constitutes his reason to be-
lieve that a round and red thing is before him (2020: 181ff). Since he has this reason, the 
best (most-rationalizing) system assigns to him this belief, rather than some twisted belief.  
 
12 Indeed, Lewis’s reductivism faces big problems. For instance, to avoid deviant interpretations of Karl’s desires, 
he says the best systems will tend to assign “reasonable” desires congruent with “the system of intrinsic values” 
(1974: 336). But then Lewis (1989) reduces values to what Karl and his community would desire to desire. This is 
circular and still faces deviant interpretations.  
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My argument for nonreductive internalist best systems theory over Williams’ reduc-
tive externalist best systems theory is simple. Williams’ theory is a form of the reductive 
externalist program. So it faces versions of the problems covered in §1. In particular, it 
violates the following desiderata:  
 
Internalism about experiential intentionality 
Experiential determinacy  
 
It is only nonreductive internalist best systems theory that accommodates these desid-
erata.  
Start with internalism about experiential intentionality. Research in psychophysics 
and neuroscience suggests that that BIV-Karl could have all the same experiences as Karl, 
including the same tomato-like experience, even though his brain states don’t have the 
function of tracking anything at all (§1.3). Given that BIV-Karl has all the same experi-
ences as Karl, it is obvious that he is conscious of (“experientially represents”) the (uninstan-
tiated) shape round, has a reason to believe that a round thing is there, and (mistakenly) 
believes that a round thing is there. But all this is inconsistent with Williams’ reductive 
externalist best systems theory. What is required is a nonreductive internalist best systems 
theory (Pautz 2013, 2019).  
Next, experiential determinacy. Given Williams’ teleological tracking theory, it is ar-
guably indeterminate whether, in the middle earth case, Baby Karl’s brain state B earth 
represents blue or yellow (Figure 1, left). If he also accepts externalist representationalism 
about phenomenal character (Dretske 1995, Tye 2019), he must say it is consequently 
indeterminate whether Baby Karl has a bluish or yellowish experience – which is incoher-
ent.13 By contrast, nonreductive internalist best systems theory avoids radical experiential 
indeterminacy. What color quality Baby Karl experientially represents is pinned down by 
his brain state.  
Likewise, Williams’ reductive externalist best systems theory lacks a plausible account 
of Karl on black-and-white earth (Figure 1, right). In this case, Karl’s visual system 
tracks17 the black-reflectance of the outer object and also tracks18 the red-reflectance of 
the inner object. Williams has two options here. First, indeterminacy: it’s indeterminate 
whether the experiential representation relation is identical with tracking17 or tracking18. 
So it is indeterminate whether he experientially represents black or red, and therefore 
indeterminate whether he has a reason to believe that a black thing is there or to believe 
that a red thing is there. The trouble with this option is that, given intentionalism, it im-
plies indeterminacy concerning whether Karl has a blackish or reddish experience – which 
is incoherent. Second, arbitrary identities: it’s just a brute fact that the experientially repre-
sentation relation is identical with (say) the tracking17 relation rather than with the intrin-
sically very similar tracking18 relation. Therefore, his tracking17 (representing17) the outer 
black-reflectance is part of his evidence, and gives him a reason to believe that a black-
reflectance object is there. But his tracking18 (representing18) the inner black-reflectance is 
 
13 Williams says that tracking-representational facts constitute Karl’s evidence (2020, 181, 185). He doesn’t explic-
itly accept the further claim of externalist intentionalism that they constitute the phenomenal character of his expe-
riences. But since it is plausible that Karl’s evidence and his phenomenal life are inseperable, he is under pressure 
to accept this further claim (Pautz forthcoming).  
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not part of his evidence, and doesn’t give him any reason to believe that a black-reflectance 
object is there. That is, tracking17 (representing17) has epistemic significance but tracking18 
(representing18) has none at all, even though they are nearly identical. Accordingly, the 
best (most rationalizing) system assigns Karl the belief that a black-reflectance object is 
there, rather than that a red-reflectance object is there. But this is intolerably arbitrary. It 
requires the problematic idea that nearly identical relations can differ radically in their 
reason-grounding significance (Pautz 2017).  
Only nonreductive internalist best systems handles this case without indeterminacy or 
arbitrariness. The austere physical facts are not the only facts. In addition to bearing the 
tracking17 relation to the back-reflectance of the outer object and the tracking18 relation to 
the red-reflectance of the inner object, Karl bears an internally-determined and irreduci-
ble relation of conscious acquaintance uniquely to a certain sensible color – say, the color 
red. This constitutes the determinate phenomenal character of his experience. The con-
scious-of relation is totally different from any tracking relation, and the sensible color red 
is totally different from any reflectance-type. So we accommodate the evident fact that in 
this situation Karl’s relation to a certain color is totally different from his relation to any-
thing else (“stands out”). And, because the conscious-of relation is totally different from 
both the tracking17 relation and the tracking18 relation, we can unproblematically hold that 
it possesses reason-grounding significance that these relations lack. So we have a more 
plausible account of how Karl uniquely has a reason to believe that a red object is there, 
and (given the best systems theory) determinately has this belief.  
In general, like Russell (1912), I think that an irreducible conscious-of relation plays a 
crucial role in determining Karl’s intentional states. Take a superficial functional iso-
morph of prelinguistic Karl – Robot Karl – that fails to stand in this relation to any states 
of affairs. For Robot Karl, the austere physical facts are the only facts. Here there are 
bound to be many equally good, coordinate “global interpretations” of the contents of 
Robot’s Karl’s “perceptions”, “evidence”, “beliefs”, “desires” (Pautz 2017). None “stands 
out”. The only reason why there is a (more or less) determinate, “stand-out” interpreta-
tion in the case of the actual Karl (as there surely is) is that, unlike Robot Karl, he bears an 
irreducible, stand-out relation of conscious acquaintance to various ostensible states of 
affairs. It’s those states of affairs that his beliefs are determinately about. 
The best systems theory of belief and desire can also accommodate the desiderata vio-
lated by the inner sentence theory: 
 
The conscious-life constraint 
The constitutive experience-belief connection 
Prelinguistic limits 
 
Start with the conscious-life constraint. We saw that the inner sentence theory vio-
lates it, allowing for “secret scrambling” of Karl’s beliefs and desires while his conscious 
experiences and behavioral dispositions remain the same. The reason is that it is an inner-
state theory of belief and desire. That is, in the first instance, it assigns contents (or con-
tent-plus-attitudes) to individual subpersonal internal states (e. g. inner sentences), which 
may be temporarily “secretly scrambled” while retaining those contents. By contrast, my 
favored form of the best systems theory is subject-based: in the first instance it assigns a 
whole system of beliefs and desires to a subject-at-time. Moreover, it does so in a way that 
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it only sensitive to the subject’s conscious experiences and consequent dispositions to consciously 
act at that time. So, unlike the inner sentence theory, it rules out “secret scrambling” of 
Karl’s beliefs and desires and satisfies the conscious-life constraint.14   
Next, the constitutive experience-belief connection. Experience is necessarily compel-
ling. For instance, necessarily, if Karl has an experience of a tomato, he is disposed to be-
lieve a red and round thing is there. The inner sentence theory violates this (§1.2). By 
contrast, the best systems theory accommodates it. Further, on this theory, it isn’t a brute 
fact, but something that can be derived from more general truths. First, it is in the essence 
of experiences to provide reasons for belief. Second, it is in the essence of beliefs to be re-
sponsive to reasons. Therefore, in the absence of contrary behavioral dispositions, he au-
tomatically count as believing the contents of his experiences.  
Finally, I am especially impressed by how the best systems theory can explain prelin-
guistic limits. The basic idea: (i) experience-based, prelinguistic reasons are necessarily lim-
ited (“epistemic limits”); (ii) prelinguistic belief is constitutively connected to such reasons 
(the best systems theory); therefore, (iii) prelinguistic belief is necessarily limited.  
For instance, suppose that prelinguistic Karl has before him a large pile of sea shell 
beads that have small holes punched into them. He repeatedly places 3 shells on the 
ground, and then strings them together into a necklace. Since his experience gives him 
reason to think that there are 3 shells on the ground, the best interpretation is that he be-
lieves that there are 3 shells, and he wants to make necklaces with 3 shells. So that is the 
correct interpretation.  
However, there are limits. For example, suppose that Karl has a magical subpersonal 
mechanism that responds to a pile of exactly 167 shells, and causes him to vigorously wave 
his arms when and only when there is such a pile (similar to the example in §1.2). One 
interpretation is that he truly believes that there are 167 shells on the ground, and he 
wants to wave him arms when there are 167 shells. But there are many others: for in-
stance, he mistakenly believes that there are 168 shells, and he wants to wave his arms 
when and only when there are 168 shells. Now here the reasons-based gambit for select-
ing a unique correct interpretation doesn’t work. For, while Karl can have an experience-
based reason to believe that there 3 rather than 2 or 4 shells there, his experience just 
doesn’t provide a reason to believe that there are 167 rather than 168. So no specific 
large-number interpretation can ever stand out as “best” or “most rationalizing”. Thus, by 
connecting beliefs to reasons, the best systems theory explains the otherwise puzzling fact 
that, without an outer language, Karl is necessarily unable to have beliefs about specific 
large numbers. It explains why, beyond small numbers, his numerical beliefs are necessarily 
only approximate.  
More generally, prelinguistic Karl has experience-based reasons to believe things 
within a certain range. Let us call this the perceptual circle (PC). As noted above, this range 
extends somewhat beyond the thin contents Karl’s sensory-perceptual experiences – but 
not too far. (So a better name might be “prelinguistic circle”.) They include beliefs about 
small numbers, the sensible properties of things, Rosch’s basic level categories (Fodor 
 
14 While I favor a subject-based version of the best systems theory of prelinguistic Karl’s beliefs and desires, Wil-
liams (2020: 11, 156) favors an inner-state version – in particular, one which assigns contents to inner sentences in 
a Fodorian language-of-thought. I would argue that such an inner-state theory violates the conscious-life con-
straint, the constitutive experience-belief connection, and prelinguistic limits, for the same reasons given in §1.2. 
This is why I favor a subject-based best systems theory.  
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2010: 29), basic spatial and temporal relations, the recent past and near future, generaliza-
tions (all emeralds are green), emotional states, basic kinship relations, and types of ac-
tions. But prelinguistic Karl can never have experience-based reasons for beliefs far out-
side this perceptual circle: for instance, beliefs about large exact numbers, very abstract 
kinds (e. g. democratic socialism), the laws of quantum mechanics, distant objects and 
people (Socrates), and so on. For his experiences have quite thin contents, concerning 
only shapes, colors, movements, propensities of movement, sounds, smells, tastes, bodily 
states – that’s it (§3.1). And the “gap” between this meager input and such outside-the-
perceptual circle matters is just too great (even with the help of a priori connecting princi-
ples). So there can never be a unique best (most rationalizing) system that attributes to 
prelinguistic Karl such a belief. That is why, on the best systems theory, prelinguistic Karl 
can never determinately count as having such a belief, no matter what he does. I know of 
no alternative proposal about the nature of belief and desire that explains prelinguistic 
limits.  
This concludes my argument for nonreductive internalist best systems theory. How-
ever, given prelinguistic limits, the best systems theory cannot be the whole story. How 
might Karl eventually form outside-the-perceptual-circle beliefs about the laws of quan-
tum mechanics and the like? Here I will suggest a different story appealing to outer lan-
guage. Accordingly, Stage Three is an explanation of linguistic meaning (§3.3). Then 
Stage Four (§3.4) is an account of how Karl can believe outside-the-perceptual-circle con-
tents by accepting outer language sentences expressing those contents.  
 
3.3 Stage Three: An Anchored Use Theory of Linguistic Meaning 
Imagine, then, that Karl and his tribe invent a language, which eventually comes to re-
semble modern English.  
What fixes the meanings of sentences and expressions of the language? I favor an an-
chored use theory. Briefly, the meanings of some initial, basic expressions were mentalistically 
anchored. This is congruent with a broadly “head-first” approach to meaning (Lewis 1975, 
Bennett 1976). But mentalistic anchoring only goes so far. For outside-the-perceptual-
circle terms, a different story is required. Let us take these points in turn.  
As I said, prelinguistic Karl can have a certain limited stock of beliefs involving mat-
ters within the perceptual circle. Since such beliefs are explanatory prior to linguistic 
meaning, they can be used to help explain the meanings of an initial stock of basic expres-
sions. For instance, perhaps “is red” initially came to mean is red by virtue of being con-
ventionally associated with the belief that something is red (Lewis 1975, Bennett 1976). 
So we have:  
 
Mentalistic anchoring. The limited prelinguistic beliefs of Karl and others helped 
explain the meanings of an initial stock of basic expressions referring to within-
the-perceptual-circle matters. Initially, mental content was prior to linguistic 
meaning.  
 
This initial stock of mentalistically-anchored terms might have included expressions 
referring to the following:  
 
small exact numbers 
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sensible properties  
Rosch’s basic level categories 
basic spatial and temporal relations 
emotional states  
basic kinship relations  
types of actions 
 
However, given prelinguistic limits, mentalistic anchoring cannot help fix the mean-
ings of expressions outside this list, such as “167”, “googolplex”, “democracy”, “neutrino”. 
For instance, we cannot say that “there are 167 shells in the pile” inherits its content from 
the explanatorily prior belief that there are 167 shells in the pile. For this would arguably 
imply that Karl could believe this exact-number content without any outer language. And 
above I argued that this is not the case.15    
Therefore, we must supplement mentalistic anchoring with:  
 
Non-mentalistic use theory. For any outside-the-perceptual-circle sentence which 
means that p, the correct account of this cannot invoke an explanatorily prior 
capacity to believe that p, because Karl’s community lacks such an explanatorily 
prior capacity. Rather, it typically appeals to ideal regularities of use.   
 
In my view, such outside-the-perceptual-circle expressions include expressions for:  
 
abstract kinds 
larger exact numbers 
certain natural kinds 
theoretical entities 
certain normative properties  
distant objects 
 
In sum, the anchored use theory is a mixed view consisting of mentalistic anchoring 
and a non-mentalistic use theory. Thought initially breathed life into language, helping to 
inject a modicum of determinacy. Then language took on a life of its own. Expressions 
came to mean things that Karl could not think about without the help of language.  
But how does the non-mentalistic use theory work? Like Horwich (2005), I favor 
metasemantic pluralism. Typically, ideal regularities of use determine meanings, but they 
differ for different types of expressions.  Let me give some examples.16   
 
15 For discussion, see Bennett 1976: 96; Blackburn 1984: 137-140; Lewis 1975: 27; and Avramides 1989: 113ff. I 
think that prelinguistic limits undermines Lewis’s (1975, 1992) two-stage mentalistic approach (taken up by 
Williams 2020: 149ff) on which the contents of all uttered sentences are inherited from explanatorily prior be-
liefs with those contents and then the contents of the all unuttered sentences can be extrapolated. Mentalistic 
anchoring only applies to a much more meager set of basic, initial expressions. For the rest of language, we need 
a separate, non-mentalistic use-theory. The result is a messier, more disjunctive story. But I think it is truer to 
the facts.  
16 A big part of Horwich’s own program is his rejection of standard “truth-referentialism” (truth and reference 
crucial to explaining meaning). But I would prefer to combine his use theory with truth-referentialism and a 
standard compositional meaning theory. See Horwich 2005: 44ff for discussion.   
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Abstract expressions. Here I mean “semantically stable” expressions for abstract proper-
ties and kinds, such as “agent”, “philosopher”, “knows”, “game”, and “democracy”. For 
these expressions, I favor a kind of anchored-hierarchical use theory. Karl and others in 
his community started with an initial stock of within-the-perceptual-circle expressions O1, 
O2, O3 . . . They are the “original” or “old” expressions. Their meanings were mentalisti-
cally-anchored, and they referred to the types and properties listed above. They enabled 
Karl’s linguistic community to grasp scenarios within the perceptual circle. So they could 
then introduce new expressions A1, A2, A3 . . . governed by certain ideal regularities of the 
form: 
 
If [O1, O2, . . .], accept sentence [. . . An . . .]  
If [O1, O2, . . .], reject sentence [. . . An . . .] 
 
Once A1, A2, A3 . . . acquired meanings in this way, they able iterate the process, and 
introduce new words B1, B2, B3 governed by new ideal regularities of use:  
 
If [A1, A2, A3 . . .], accept sentence [. . . Bn . . .] 
If [A1, A2, A3 . . .], reject sentence [ . . . Bn . . .] 
 
Finally, they reach very abstract expressions, such as “game”, “democracy” and “su-
pervenience”. In this way, expressions of Karl’s language come to be associated with very 
abstract properties that would be outside of his cognitive reach without language. 
These ideal regularities of usage are determined by the dispositions of Karl and others 
to use the expressions A1, A2, A3 . . . in response to experienced scenarios and to correct 
each other’s usage. Because their dispositions can be in “error” and only cover finitely 
many cases, there is a gap between them and the ideal regularities. To close the gap, we 
must appropriate another Lewisian idea: naturalness as a kind of external constraint 
(Chalmers MSa: 10).  
This anchored-hierarchical picture does not require that the “new” expressions are 
easily definable in expressions of the “old” expressions (think of “game”). Nor does it re-
quire that the original, mentalistically-anchored expressions are rich enough to form an 
analytic scrutability-base for all truths.17  
Mathematical expressions. As I said, the conscious-based best systems theory explains 
how prelinguistic Karl could have determinate beliefs about small exact numbers. He 
might also have beliefs about the next number. Then his community invented a system of 
number words. The meanings of the first few number-words could directly mentalistically 
anchored. For the rest, speakers had the intention that the next number-word in the 
counting sequence refers to the next number (Dehaene 1999, Spelke 2003). In this way, 
some number-words came to refer to larger exact numbers, like 10. This enabled them to 
have the intentions required for setting up the Arabic numeral system.  
 
17 Chalmers’s (MSb) defends anchored inferentialism. Unlike my own view, his view does presuppose a scrutability 
thesis. There are other differences. Chalmers applies his theory to “mental concepts” and holds that mental 
content is always prior to linguistic content, while I give priority to outer language for all outside-the-
perceptual-circle content. In addition, Chalmers seeks a uniform theory for all non-basic concepts, while I think 
(following Horwich 2005) that we must settle for a messy, pluralistic approach.  
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Once they can think of large exact numbers in this way, they were able to introduce 
the symbol “+”. Even though their dispositions are finite and “error-prone”, the simplest 
or most “natural” ideal rule for this expression is: accept instances of “x+y=z” iff “z” stands 
for the number which is equal to x plus y. This solves the plus-quus problem (Chalmers 
MSa: 10).  
Logical constants. Once the contents of sentences are fixed, we can enter into certain 
inferential practices (“entry rules and exist rules”) with them. And this can fix the semantic 
values of the logical constants (e. g. Williams 2020: 38ff).  
Certain natural kind terms. When prelinguistic Karl quenched his thirst, it was perhaps 
indeterminate whether he wanted to drink water (the natural kind) or the watery stuff (the 
surface kind). Then his community came up with a term, “water”, that specifically refers 
to the natural kind rather than the surface kind. This enabled him to have beliefs specifi-
cally about the natural kind. Maybe meaning of “water” is constituted by the fact that ide-
al law for its usage is: accept “x is water” iff x has the underlying nature of the stuff in our 
seas, rivers, lakes and rain (Horwich 2005: 27). 
Theoretical expressions. Perhaps the meaning of “neutrino” is fixed by our underived ac-
ceptance of “If there is a type of particles that plays the neutrino-role, then there are neu-
trinos” (Horwich ibid.). 
This completes my sketch of a non-mentalist use theory for outside-the-perceptual-
circle expressions of outer language. My discussion has been short on detail. I have only 
given a “picture”. But everyone needs such a theory. Those who favor an inner sentence 
theory of belief need a non-mentalistic use theory for expressions of the language of 
thought, where “use” is understood broadly to include asymmetric dependence (Fodor 
1990), conceptual role (Williams 2020), and so on. I rejected the inner sentence theory 
(§1.2). Instead, I think that the explanation starts with expressions of outer language. But, 
no matter where we start, we are all in the same boat: we all need a non-mentalistic use 
theory of how our representations came to latch onto some outside-the-perceptual-circle 
contents rather than others.  
 
3.4 Stage Four: Language Extends Belief Beyond the Perceptual Circle 
 
In Stage Three, we saw that, since the beliefs of prelinguistic Karl cannot extend beyond 
the perceptual circle, there must be a theory (a “use” theory) of how sentences of his lan-
guage came to mean outside-of-the-perceptual-circle contents which doesn’t appeal to an 
explanatorily prior ability to believe those contents. Given this, Stage Four suggests that Karl 
comes to believe outside-the-perceptual-circle contents by understanding and accepting 
sentences expressing those contents. In general, language gives Karl a new way of believ-
ing:  
 
The outer sentence theory of belief. If Karl understands and accepts an outer sen-
tence s that means that p in his community, then this grounds his believing that 
p. 18    
 
18 In some cases s can also be associated with a different content p* (a “primary intension”) in Karl’s idiolect on 




So Karl has two ways of believing something. One way is given by the best systems 
theory introduced in Stage Two (§3.2). Call beliefs grounded in this way language-
independent beliefs. The other is given by the outer sentence theory. Call beliefs grounded 
in this way language-mediated beliefs. The result is:  
 
Pluralism about belief: To believe that p is to satisfy either (i) the best systems 
condition or (ii) the outer sentence condition for believing that p.19   
 
Now we have an explanation of outside-the-perceptual-circle belief as well as inside-
the-perceptual circle belief. Karl believes inside-the-perceptual-circle contents by satisfy-
ing the best systems condition. In fact, once he has language, he can also believe the same 
(or similar) contents by accepting sentences that express those contents. For instance, Karl 
believes that Friedrich is his friend in a language-independent way; given his experience-
based reasons and behavioral dispositions, all the best interpretations assign to him this 
belief. He believes a similar content in a language-mediated way as well: he understands 
and accepts “Friedrich is my friend”. As for outside-the-perceptual-circle contents, Karl 
has only one way of believing them: by understanding and accepting sentences that ex-
press them. The ideal use regularities for the expressions in Karl’s community associate 
them with increasingly abstract properties and kinds lying farther and farther outside the 
perceptual circle. By accepting sentences employing those expressions, Karl believes con-
tents he couldn’t believe without the help of an outer language (e. g. there are 167 shells 
there, the laws of quantum mechanics). The capacity for outside-the-perceptual-circle 
belief (Stage Four) evolved simultaneously with outside-the-perceptual-circle linguistic 
meaning (Stage Three).20  
Typically, Karl’s language-independent and language-mediated beliefs align, as when 
he believes that Friedrich is his friend. But sometimes they do not. For example, suppose 
that Karl hallucinates a human face and acts as if he is afraid. But he knows that he is hal-
lucinating and so accepts “there is no face there”. Does he believe that there is a face there 
or does he believe that there is no face? We feel pulled in different directions (Byrne 
2018: 146). I think that the right thing to say is that he believes that there is a face there in 
a language-independent way and he believes that there is no face there in a language-
mediated way. Likewise, when a student in a fraternity initiation trick is threatened with a 
red-hot poker but in fact is touched on his back with a piece of ice, and then says “That’s 
hot!”, his language-mediated belief is mistaken but his language-independent belief about 
his experiential state is correct (Lewis 1999).  
 
19 Bermudez (2003: 66, 150ff), Dennett (1987: 19, 201, 207, 233) and Speaks (2010: 234ff) defend other forms of 
pluralism about belief.    
20 In §3.2, I defended “epistemic limits”: Karl’s experience-based reasons are limited to within-the-perceptual-circle 
matters (e. g. there are 3 shells). I suggested that this, together with the best systems (reasons-responsive) theory of 
belief, explains why his prelinguistic beliefs are likewise limited. In that case, we need a different story about the 
source of his reasons for his more sophisticated, language-mediated outside-the-perceptual-circle beliefs (e. g. there 
are 1,067 shells). I accept epistemic pluralism. There is more than one source of good epistemic standing. Karl’s 
outside-the-perceptual-circle beliefs can be “justified” or “reasonable” in the sense that they are reliably formed, or 
have a high probability given what he knows in a certain way.  
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Karl’s language-independent beliefs, as given by the best systems theory, are rational-
ly constrained. As for his language-mediated beliefs, there is more latitude here. For in-
stance, if Karl acquires Cotard’s syndrome, he might believe that he is dead, by under-
standing and accepting (in some minimal sense) the sentence “I’m dead”. In this way, my 
pluralist theory allows for irrational belief (pace Smithies 2019: 150).  
The argument for pluralism (or “disjunctivism”) about believing is simple. For prelin-
guistic Karl’s beliefs, there is a strong case for a subject-based best systems theory. It satis-
fies the desiderata that the inner sentence theory violates (§3.2). But, as we saw, this theo-
ry will only work for Karl’s within-the-perceptual-circle beliefs. So, for Karl’s outside-
the-perceptual-circle beliefs, we need a different theory. Here the outer sentence theory 
fills the bill. The resulting pluralist theory explains why some thought is possible without 
an outer language but other forms of thought require an outer language. And, unlike the 
inner sentence theory of belief, it remains in line with the conscious-life constraint, because it 
only appeals to Karl’s conscious experiences and dispositions to consciously act – now in-
cluding his dispositions to “accept” outer sentences.  
The pluralist theory says that one way of believing that p is by understanding and ac-
cepting a sentence meaning that p. How to explain these relations? 
Take understanding first. I think that no general and simple analysis is possible. The 
conditions on understanding an expression differ for different types of expressions. For 
instance, the conditions required for understanding logical expressions differ from the 
conditions for understanding moral expressions. For some expressions (e. g. “democra-
cy”), counting as understanding them might typically require understanding some other, 
more basic expressions. The conditions on understanding are never hard and fast. Under-
standing admits of degree. That is why there is no clear answer to the question of whether a 
6-year old who says “daddy is a physicist” really thinks that daddy is a physicist. 21   
Even though conscious experience has only thin content (§3.1), it anchors all under-
standing. A robot with no experiences doesn’t really understand any words, even if there is 
a sense in which the robot’s words play similar inferential roles to our words. For instance, 
to understand “167”, you need to know what a number is. And that requires having the 
capacity to have experiences of numbers of things. This is another respect in which con-
sciousness is essential to my account.  
Now turn to accepting. Since the outer sentence theory proposes that believing an out-
side-the-perceptual-circle content p is to be explained in terms of accepting a sentence 
that means that p, I cannot on pain of circularity say that accepting a sentence that means 
that p is to be explained in terms of believing that p. The outer sentence theory requires 
acceptance is characterizable in belief-independent terms, since it is used to explain how 
Karl believes outside-the-perceptual-circle contents. (Similarly, since the inner sentence 
theory (Fodor 1990) explains believing that p in terms of accepting* - that is, having in 
one’s belief-box - an inner sentence that means that p, it requires a belief-independent 
account of this.) I have no general analysis up my sleeve. As with understanding a sen-
tence, I think that the conditions on accepting a sentence differ for different types of sen-
 
21 By contrast, since whether you have a certain cognitive experience with built-in content p is presumably a bina-
ry, nongraded matter, the cognitive experience theory has the implausible implication that there is a form of 
understanding or grasping that it is “on-off” and doesn’t admit of degree. See Bourget 2015 for an interesting 
discussion.   
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tences. Often accepting a sentence involves a disposition to use the sentence in reasoning 
and planning. Although I have no belief-independent account of accepting a sentence up 
my sleeve, I am confident that accepting is indeed prior to believing when it comes to out-
side-the-perceptual-circle matters, so that such an account must be possible in principle.  
I have proposed a pluralist theory of the state of believing. What about the activity of 
thinking? Karl can also count as thinking that p in multiple ways. For instance, he can en-
gage in spatial thinking using mental imagery. However, Karl’s outside-the-perceptual-
circle thinking is generally realized by “inner speech”, understood as a quasi-perceptual 
process representing outer speech (Carruthers 1996: chap. 2; Byrne 2018: 198ff). In these 
cases, the content of the Karl’s thought is just the content (in the context) of the imagined 
sentence, or a sentence he would take to elucidate it. Since the content of the sentence (e. 
g. “all the beers are in the fridge”, “democracy is in trouble”) is bound to be indeterminate 
and incomplete in various ways, so is the content of Karl’s thought.  
The resulting pluralist view of belief and thought is superior to the cognitive experi-
ence theory of thought that goes with the standard phenomenal intentionality program. 
We saw in §2 that the cognitive experience theory fails to adequately accommodate the 




Prelinguistic limits  
 
By contrast, my pluralist theory of thought nicely accommodates these ideas.  
First, the pluralist theory minimizes danglers. To explain how Karl believes sensible 
contents rather than deviant contents, it needs no special “intentional laws”.  
For example, return to Stage Two in which Karl lacks an outer language. He might 
believe that someone is a friend, rather than a friend*. How so? The cognitive experience 
theory appeals to a special cognitive experience with the built-in content he is my friend, 
together with a special brute intentional law linking this experience to his brain state 
(§2.2). By contrast, my pluralist theory requires no such special intentional law. For such 
language-independent beliefs, I accept the best systems theory. Karl’s history of experiences 
gives him a stronger reason to believe that the person is a friend (more natural) than to 
believe that the person is a friend* (less natural). Compare: his experiences give him a 
stronger reason to believe that emeralds are blue (more natural) than to believe that they 
are all grue (less natural). The best systems (reasons-based) theory uses this generally-
accepted epistemic fact to explain why Karl believes that the person is a friend, rather than 
a friend*.22  
Recall that we must explain indeterminacy as well as determinacy (§2.2). For instance, 
in Stage Four, when Karl thinks that 68 plus 57 equals 15, the content of his thought is 
perfectly precise and determinate. By contrast, when he thinks democracy is in trouble, 
the content of his thought is quite indeterminate. We saw that cognitive experience theo-
 
22 See e. g. Lewis 1986: 38ff and 1994: 427ff. Lewis is often associated with a toy “use plus naturalness” theory, 
which uses “naturalness” as a basic constraint (and which gives priority to language). In fact, in the case of mental 
content, he explicitly derives his “naturalness constraint” from his more general best systems or “reasons-based” 
theory of mental content (Pautz 2013: 222; Williams 2020: 62). Some objections to the toy theory do not apply 
to Lewis’s actual view (Pautz 2013: 221-222; Dorr 2019: sect. 4.7).  
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rists can only say “some brain states produce cognitive experience with determinate con-
tents while other brain states produce cognitive experiences with indeterminate contents”. 
By contrast, my pluralist account provides a real explanation. In the case of such outside-
the-perceptual thoughts, I accept the outer sentence theory. Karl doesn’t grasp any such 
contents merely by having certain “cognitive” experiences. Rather, he grasps the contents 
only by understanding and accepting the sentences - “68 plus 57 equals 125” and “democ-
racy is in trouble” - which mean those contents. This in turn involves use-dispositions and 
not just his experience at the time (§2.4). Our use of mathematical expressions is highly 
constrained, and here there is a very “natural” and simple use-rule that fits use, namely the 
“plus” rule (Chalmers MSa: 10).23 By contrast, our use of “is a democracy” is less con-
strained, and here there are many equally natural ideal laws of use that fit our use disposi-
tions, corresponding to different precisifications of “democracy”. That explains the differ-
ence in content-determinacy without special intentional laws. 
Next, holism. Karl’s thoughts are holistically bound up with other things – attempts 
to do things, other thoughts, sensory-perceptual experiences, language-use, and so on. 
The cognitive experience of thought can accommodate this only by positing a slew of 
brute and implausible necessary connections between Karl’s “cognitive experiences” and 
these other things (§2.3). By contrast, because my pluralist theory eliminates cognitive 
experiences, it avoids the need to posit such special, brute necessary connections. In effect, 
it reduces thoughts with rich contents to complex holistic conditions involving actual and 
potential sensory-perceptual experiences with thin contents. Holism is a trivial conse-
quence.  
Finally, prelinguistic limits. We saw that the cognitive experience theory makes pre-
linguistic limits totally mysterious. By contrast, my pluralist (“disjunctivist”) theory ele-
gantly explains it. The best systems theory uses “epistemic limits” to explain why prelin-
guistic Karl’s thoughts are necessarily limited and why the limits are what they are (§3.2). 
The only other way of having thoughts is given by the outer sentence theory. That is why 
Karl’s thoughts beyond these limits are necessarily language-mediated.    
 
3.5 Credo: Thin Experience Reductivism 
Let thin experience reductivism be the claim that all the mental facts about Karl – including 
all the intentional facts – reduce to (i) facts about actual and potential sensory-perceptual-
emotional experiences with thin contents (“thin experiences”) and (ii) the functional-
behavioral facts about him (including his linguistic dispositions and “wide” functional facts 
involving his relation to his environment). On this view, the only experiences that must be 
mentioned in the reductive base for Karl’s mental life are his experiences with thin con-
tents. Let the further fact view be any view on thin experience reductivism fails. The cogni-
tive experience theory of thought (§2.1) is an example.  
 
23 Horgan and Graham (2010: 328-329) object that an external naturalness constraint would need to be an extra 
“brute fact”. (Philip Goff also pressed this objection in discussion.) But all of us already believe that plus is more 
natural than quusg. So the plus-interpretation “stands out” – and this is the core intuition. Thus, in fact, the natu-
ralness-based solution to underdetermination doesn’t require belief anything “extra” beyond what we already 
accept. Indeed, it is rather Horgan and Graham’s own solution that requires something extra: a special intentional 
law (dangler) linking Karl’s brain state to his alleged “cognitive experience” that 68 plus (rather than quusg) 57 
equals 125 (as we saw in §2.2).  
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My multistage theory starts with Karl’s thin experiences. So it is congruent with thin 
experience reductivism. Since supplying specific reductive analyses is difficult, any such 
specific form of thin experience reductivism will be controversial. However, we can offer 
two general arguments that some form of thin experience reductivism is right.  
First, the argument from small steps. To illustrate, consider mathematical thought. In 
Stage One, Karl certainly starts off with only thin experiences. So initially thin experience 
reductivism is true. For instance, he repeatedly places 3 shells on the ground, and then 
strings them together into a necklace. This is sufficient for his judgement that there are 
three shells there. A further fact – for instance, a mysterious “cognitive experience” – is not 
required. Next suppose that he learns a body-based “language” in which he points to dif-
ferent parts of his body (starting with the fingers) to indicate different numbers. He points 
at a pile of shells and then points at his big toe, thereby communicating the thought there 
are 29 shells in the pile (Dehaene 1997: 93-95). Intuitively, all this might only involve Karl 
having “thin experiences” of parts of his body. It needn’t involve his having, at some spe-
cific moment, a totally novel “cognitive experience” with the built-in content there are 29 
shells in the pile. Finally, suppose that he gradually learns a base-ten number system and 
different function-names (“plus”, “minus”, etc.). One day he thinks 68 plus 57 equals 125. 
Again, intuitively, at no single step in this process does Karl need to have a wholly novel 
kind of experience – a “cognitive” experience - with a built-in rich content 68 plus 57 equals 
125. Intuitively, it’s enough that he has thin experiences of new symbols and gradually 
becomes increasingly competent in using them. The result: merely Karl’s thin experiences 
and increasingly sophisticated linguistic behavior can constitute his thinking there are 3 
shells, there are 29 shells, and 68 plus 57 equals 125.  
Second, a more elaborate supervenience argument, which will proceed in two steps. 
First, thin experience supervenience is plausible. Second, thin experience supervenience 
supports thin experience reductivism.  
First, thin experience supervenience is supported by reflection on duplication cases. 
Suppose that on different occasions Karl has various mental states. He has an experience 
of a rock flying towards him and moves out of the way. He believes that a rock is flying 
towards him. He says “68 plus 57 is 125” and believes that 68 plus 57 is 125. He gets a 
paycheck and says, while pointing to his financial institution across the street, “I’m bring-
ing this check to the bank”, meaning that he is bringing his check to that financial institu-
tion. He is happy-go-lucky and says “the future looks bright” and believes that the future 
looks bright. Now consider Twin Karl, a thin experience duplicate of Karl. He (i) has all the 
sensory-perceptual-emotional experiences with thin phenomenal contents as Karl and (ii) 
is like Karl as regards all functional-behavioral facts.  
Given the Karl and Twin Karl are inner-outer duplicates in all these respects, could 
their beliefs, thoughts and desires nevertheless radically differ? For instance, could Twin 
Karl “really” secretly believe the negations of everything Karl believes, despite having all 
the same thin experiences, saying all the same things, and having all the same dispositions 
as Karl? Or, when he has the same vivid experience of rock flying towards him, could 
Twin Karl differ from Karl in secretly and irrationally thinking that the rock is moving 
away (§3.2), even though he ducks, says it is headed towards him, and so on? When he 
says “68 plus 57 is 125”, could he differ from Karl in “really” thinking 68 quusg 57 is 125, 
even though he does sums the same way as Karl under all possible conditions? When he 
gets his paycheck and says, while pointing to his financial institution across the street, 
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“I’m bringing this to the bank”, could he differ from Karl in that he “really” means he is 
bringing it to an embankment, even though (like Karl) all his verbal and behavioral disposi-
tions are appropriate to the financial-institution interpretation (Siewert 1998: 279ff)? 
Could he “really” secretly think the future looks dark, even though all his thin-
experiences, speech and dispositions are happy-go-lucky? I do not find such radical varia-
tion between Twin Karl and Karl to be clearly conceivable. This supports thin experience 
supervenience.  
It might be said that, although Twin Karl’s thoughts could not radically differ from 
Karl’s, it is conceivable that he should be a “cognitive zombie” who lacks all thought, con-
trary to thin experience supervenience. For instance, Terry Horgan (Horgan 2013: 243-
244) says that Twin Karl might be a mere perfect “symbol manipulator” who doesn’t real-
ly understand any English sentences. If Twin Karl might be a complete thin-experiential-
cum-functional duplicate of Karl and yet lack understanding, then states of understanding 
must be elusive “further facts” – for instance, special “cognitive experiences”.  
But this is not clearly conceivable. To see this, start with rudimentary contents, as in 
the sequence argument above. Here Horgan’s claim is very implausible. For instance, it is 
quite clear that, just by virtue of having the same sensory-perceptual experience of 3 shells 
on the ground and the same behavioral dispositions as Karl, Twin Karl will also perfectly 
well understand the content there are 3 shells there. Further, as we go up the conceptual 
ladder in small steps, at each point, changes in thin experiences and linguistic competence 
are intuitively enough for changes in thought and understanding. So Twin Karl must 
think and understand the same things as Karl.  
Thin experience supervenience, then, is plausible. The next step of the argument says 
that thin experience supervenience supports thin experience reductivism over the further 
fact view. After all, if some thoughts and states of understanding were really “further 
facts” or extra “cognitive experiences” (Kriegel, Siewert, Goff), we would expect they could 
radically differ between Karl and Twin Karl in the above-mentioned ways, while holding 
everything else fixed, contrary to thin experience supervenience. But we saw this is incon-
ceivable. By contrast, thin experience reductivism offer a simple explanation of thin expe-
rience supervenience.  
Here is an analogy (Lewis 1994: 413). Take a black-and-white pixel-screen. The ge-
stalt properties of the screen (containing a square, containing a happy-face) supervene on the 
arrangement of black and white pixels. This suggests that they reduce to such arrange-
ments. 
Because of the “hard problem of consciousness”, Karl’s conscious experiences with 
thin contents are mysterious. But, if we accept thin experience reductivism rather than the 
further fact view, then we can rest assured that Karl’s other mental states with “richer” 
contents (e. g. the thought that 68 plus 57 equals 125) pose no additional profound mys-
tery. To explain them, we don’t need to posit dangling “intentional linking laws” (§2.2). 
For, although it’s hard to supply the details, we know that they somehow reduce to patterns 
in Karl’s actual and possible thin experiences and relations to the world, just as gestalt 








I argued that both the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality 
program miss out on certain desiderata on an adequate theory of intentionality (§§1-2). 
Then I sketched a multistage theory of intentionality that does satisfy them (§3). Maybe it 
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